Pip: Welcome to the IMDG Code Compliance Centre podcast, where the gap between what the regulations say and what actually happens at the terminal gate is, it turns out, a very wide gap indeed.

Mara: This episode covers work by Shashi Kallada across three areas: a manufacturing-site explosion in Italy that has direct implications for Class 1 dangerous goods practice, twenty years of failed IMO attempts to stop carriers refusing compliant radioactive cargo, and a plain-language guide that tries to put IMDG compliance in the hands of the people who actually pack the containers.

Pip: Let's start with what happened at a munitions plant outside Rome.

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Fire, Explosion, and What It Means for Class 1 Practice

Mara: On the afternoon of 13 August 2026, a fire broke out in the powder-pressing department of the KNDS Ammo Italy plant at Colleferro, roughly 40 to 60 kilometres southeast of Rome, followed by a secondary explosion audible for kilometres.

Pip: The post notes something worth sitting with: "The plant was running on reduced summer-holiday staffing at the time — around 24 workers, all of whom were accounted for and reached designated safe areas under existing evacuation protocols."

Mara: The mayor of Colleferro said the outcome could have been far more serious had it occurred outside the holiday period. No injuries were reported. The Velletri prosecutor's office has opened a file; no cause has been officially determined.

Pip: For DG compliance professionals, the post draws a line between the industrial Seveso regime governing this site and the IMDG, 49 CFR, and ADR frameworks we work in daily — but the underlying hazard class is identical.

Mara: The post makes two practical points worth carrying into DG work: the line between process risk and transport risk is thinner than the regulatory silos suggest, and staffing levels are a variable worth modelling at high-hazard sites independent of whatever triggered the event.

Pip: Twenty years of IMO circulars couldn't stop carriers saying no to radioactive cargo — let's look at why.

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Twenty Years of IMO Guidance That Hasn't Worked

Mara: The central tension here is straightforward: cargo that fully complies with the IMDG Code is being refused by carriers and ports, and the IMO has known about this problem, formally, for over two decades.

Pip: The post reaches back to 1962 to show how old this actually is. A UK competent authority representative at a US Atomic Energy Commission symposium said: "The people that we have had trouble with are those that we call minor competent authority — people like ports and airfields, station-masters and people who are somewhere in the chain, and they have enough power to refuse to accept your material, but not enough time to understand what the regulations are about."

Mara: In 2026 the entities refusing are not station-masters. They are the world's largest container lines. The post traces three IMO instruments — FAL.6/Circ.12 in 2005, Assembly Resolution A.984(24) also in 2005, and the WNTI submission FAL 42/16/1 in 2018 — and none of them compelled a single carrier to carry anything.

Pip: The resolution language says it all: invites, also invites, further invites, urges, requests. The word "requires" does not appear.

Mara: The WNTI analysis presented at the 2021 IAEA Technical Meeting found that of 84 key international ports, 74 percent accept loading and unloading, 74 percent accept transit, but only 15 percent accept transhipment. And that 74 percent figure is misleading, because every node in the chain must independently say yes.

Pip: The post also covers the Maersk reversal in 2023 — after refusing Class 7 since acquiring P&O Nedlloyd in 2006, Maersk now accepts non-fissile cargo from audited shippers on Maersk-operated vessels only. The owned-vessel condition is the critical caveat inside alliance slot-sharing arrangements.

Mara: As of 2026, the IAEA Denial of Shipment Working Group has drafted a Code of Conduct — but member states did not agree it. A non-legally-binding Joint Statement is in development as the fallback.

Pip: From a problem that can strand a cancer-treatment isotope at a transhipment hub, to a guide designed to stop the mispack before it ever gets there.

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Getting the Booking Form and the Container Right

Mara: The question this segment addresses is a practical one: most container fires and dangerous goods incidents trace back to the same failures, so what does it take to fix them at the point where decisions are actually made?

Pip: The post quotes its own framing directly: "Most container fires and dangerous goods incidents trace back to the same failures: cargo mis-declared at booking, packed without understanding segregation, or not secured properly in the CTU."

Mara: So the upshot is that the IMDG Code already covers all of this — the gap is that the people filling out booking forms and packing containers have rarely had it explained in language they can act on.

Pip: Which is the problem that Book It Right and Pack It Tight, jointly published by the UK P&I Club and TT Club, is designed to close — a free plain-language guide revised for IMDG Amendment 42-24, mandatory from 1 January 2026.

Mara: It is addressed to the full chain: shippers, consignors, forwarders, NVOCCs, CTU packers, carrier booking and documentation staff, and terminal operators. The post makes a pointed distinction — a guide read by a compliance manager changes a policy document, but the same guide handed to the person packing the container changes what happens to the cargo.

Pip: That distinction matters more than it might sound. Policy documents don't pack containers. People do.

Mara: The guide is available free from both publishers, and the post links directly to both download pages. If you are anywhere in that stakeholder chain and haven't read it, that is a straightforward gap to close.

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Pip: A munitions plant fire, two decades of advisory instruments that don't bind anyone, and a free guide trying to reach the person actually packing the box — the compliance gap runs from manufacture all the way to the terminal gate.

Mara: Next episode we will see what else is on the site. There is always more in the chain worth examining.


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By Shashi Kallada

35 years in Merchant Shipping, Last 23 years working on IMDG Code. Ex Sailor, Ex Manager Global Dangerous Goods Maersk Line.

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Discover more from IMDG Code Compliance Centre

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