Incident Review · Class 5.1 Oxidizing Substances

Two P&I clubs have reported container fires in correctly declared sodium percarbonate loaded at two Chinese ports. Neither has named an initiating cause. Two earlier casualties show how far investigators got with the same question.

Since early October 2026, several container fires have involved UN 3378 SODIUM CARBONATE PEROXYHYDRATE (sodium percarbonate), Class 5.1, loaded at Qingdao and Lianyungang. NorthStandard issued an alert on 7 October and updated it on 16 October. The Swedish Club followed on 9 November with operational advice prepared with Brookes Bell. Both clubs state that the cargo in the cases they reviewed was correctly declared. Neither identifies what started the decomposition.

What Is on Record

  • Cargo: UN 3378 SODIUM CARBONATE PEROXYHYDRATE, Class 5.1. The Dangerous Goods List carries entries for Packing Group II and Packing Group III, with EmS F-A, S-Q. The alerts do not state the packing group of the consignments involved.
  • Ports of loading: Qingdao and Lianyungang, China.
  • Period: from early October 2026. NorthStandard reported multiple fires on 7 October and one further fire on 16 October. Neither club gives a total.
  • Declaration: the cargo in the cases the clubs reviewed was correctly declared by UN number, class and packing group. The alerts do not establish the initiating causes.
  • Cause: not identified. No shipper, manufacturer, batch, packaging type or stow position has been published.

How Sodium Percarbonate Decomposition Leads to Fire

Sodium percarbonate is not combustible. It is an addition compound of sodium carbonate and hydrogen peroxide, and it decomposes exothermically to sodium carbonate, water and oxygen. Moisture, contamination and heat can each start or accelerate that decomposition. When the cargo generates heat faster than it loses it, the temperature climbs and the reaction speeds up.

The International Chemical Safety Card gives 50°C as the temperature above which self-accelerating decomposition can occur, releasing heat, oxygen and steam. Solvay’s handling sheet for the product gives the same 50°C threshold and puts the peak temperature of a self-accelerating decomposition at 110°C, with 600 m³ of oxygen and steam released per tonne. It lists the contaminants that can start or accelerate decomposition: water, transition metals (iron, manganese, nickel, chromium) and their salts, organic materials, acids, bases, reducing agents and dirt. Neither figure is a fixed limit for every grade and package: Solvay’s own account is that the product self-heats whenever heat generation exceeds heat lost to the surroundings. In a closed container that hot, oxygen-enriched atmosphere surrounds whatever combustible material is present: typically woven polypropylene bags, polyethylene liners, timber pallets and the plywood floor.

An investigation therefore has two separate questions: what destabilised the product, and what fuel then burned. Fire damage can make the first hard to answer, as both casualty reports below show.

Three Sets of Incidents Compared

IncidentCargo as shippedOutcomeFinding on initiating cause
CMA CGM Rabelais, 6 April 2022 Tablets with less than 45% sodium percarbonate, shipped from Ningbo, not declared as dangerous goods Deck container fire; 14 containers damaged; chief officer seriously injured; no structural damage to the ship Not determined. Moisture contact with the cargo considered likely
Hong Kong-registered container ship, reported May 2026 UN 3378 in a deck container, first tier above hatch no. 1 Ship abandoned; constructive total loss Not established. Moisture or impurities, or external heat from lithium-ion batteries stowed above
Qingdao and Lianyungang loadings, from October 2026 UN 3378, correctly declared Several container fires Not identified in the club alerts

CMA CGM Rabelais, April 2022

At 2000 local time on 6 April 2022, in position 06° 19′ N 094° 30′ E, the watch officers of the Malta-flagged CMA CGM Rabelais noticed a strong unusual smell and white smoke forward. The vessel had left Singapore the previous day for Nhava Sheva. The crew traced the fire to a 20-foot container in position 27-05-82, on the forward starboard hatch cover of cargo hold no. 4. Its door was bulging and partly open, with small white tablets lying near it. Class 3 tank containers were stowed in the two tiers directly above.

The container carried no dangerous goods marks and its cargo documents were not on board; they reached the vessel days after the fire started. They showed 920 cartons of “oxygenic tablets”, 25.8 kg gross each, shipped from Ningbo, China, for delivery at Mumbai. The material safety data sheet gave the composition as less than 45% sodium percarbonate and more than 55% sodium sulphate anhydrous, for oxygen supply in fishery water. The same sheet stated that the IMDG Code did not apply, yet warned that damp material may decompose exothermically and ignite combustibles, and classified the product as an oxidizing material under Canada’s WHMIS.

The chief officer climbed a portable ladder of about 6 m to check whether the fire had spread into the gaps between containers. The ladder was not secured. At about 2250 it fell as he started down, and he landed on the lashing bridge with rib fractures and a collapsed lung. The vessel headed for Port Klang. A firefighting tug joined on 8 April, and on 10 April a shore fire team punched holes in the affected containers, sprayed foam and water inside and declared the fire out. Fourteen containers were damaged. The ship suffered no structural damage.

Malta’s Marine Safety Investigation Unit could not determine the exact cause. Laboratory tests on cargo samples were inconclusive because burnt packaging had mixed with the decomposed cargo. The investigation believed that moisture reaching the cargo likely caused it to decompose and ignite the packaging, through damaged packaging combined with one or more of: container sweat in the tropics, packaging that was wet at loading, and rainwater entering through defective door seals. It also recorded that a chemical reaction with the steel staples of the cartons was possible if the packaging had been damaged. Air temperature on the day was 33°C.

The report, which applies the 2020 Edition of the IMDG Code (Amendment 40-20), makes one stowage point directly. Had the cargo been classified as Class 5.1, the Code would have required at least one container space between it and the Class 3 tank containers, and would not have permitted Class 3 in the same vertical line. After the fire the managers supplied their ships with a fog lance kit that pierces a container wall, and portable twin hydrants.

These findings concern a formulated product containing sodium percarbonate, and do not transfer automatically to a consignment of the substance declared as UN 3378.

Hong Kong-Registered Container Ship, MSIN 5/2026

The Hong Kong Marine Department’s Merchant Shipping Information Note No. 5/2026, issued on 18 May 2026, describes a fire on a Hong Kong-registered container ship under way in tropical waters. The note does not give the date of the casualty. At night the bridge team saw light smoke forward. The crew found flames at the bottom of a deck container on the first tier above hatch no. 1. The fire spread to adjacent containers and then into the holds. After nearly eight hours of firefighting it reached the accommodation and the master ordered the ship abandoned. All personnel were rescued by a passing vessel. The fire burned for close to three months and the owner declared a constructive total loss.

Most physical evidence was destroyed, so the investigation relied on crew statements and cargo records. It concluded that the fire most likely involved exothermic decomposition of sodium carbonate peroxyhydrate, which fed oxygen and heat to the packaging and nearby cargo. It judged ambient air temperature alone insufficient to start that decomposition, and identified two candidate triggers: water or impurities entering the container, or heat from thermal runaway of lithium-ion batteries in a sun-exposed container stowed in the tier above.

The initiating mechanism was not conclusively determined. The note does not support a statement that sodium percarbonate alone caused the loss of the ship.

Securing Failure and Package Damage

Inadequate securing lets bags and pallets shift, chafe and tear. Spilled product can then lie on damp timber, cardboard, dirt, rust scale or residues of a previous cargo. Manufacturer safety data sheets warn that wet product decomposes exothermically and that decomposition in contact with organic material can be highly exothermic. This is a credible route to a fire. The Malta report on CMA CGM Rabelais lists damaged packaging as the condition that lets moisture, or the steel staples of a carton, reach the product. Solvay does not recommend mild steel for any equipment in contact with the product, and tells users never to return spilled product to its original package.

It has limits as an explanation. Package damage does not by itself show that decomposition began there, and intact packages can hold product already affected by moisture or impurities at the factory. The published alerts give no evidence that either occurred in the affected containers. A common packing practice, packaging supplier or stuffing contractor would have to be examined before drawing a conclusion.

Water in Carriage and Water in Firefighting

Moisture has to be kept away from this cargo in transit, yet water is the recommended extinguishing medium. Small quantities of moisture from a leaking roof, a wet floor or condensation can start or accelerate decomposition without removing any significant heat. In a fire, water is used because it can take heat out of the reacting material. Whether it succeeds depends on how far decomposition has gone, how the cargo is arranged and whether the water reaches the affected material.

The Swedish Club names water as the principal extinguishing medium for a UN 3378 fire and warns that extended boundary cooling and container flooding may be needed. It advises that closing ventilation and releasing carbon dioxide may not be effective in the initial stages, because the cargo generates its own oxygen. It also advises against opening container doors solely to fight the fire, and recommends a piercing nozzle or similar device so that water can enter with the doors shut. NorthStandard reports that a HydroPen has been used effectively to contain and extinguish fires in affected containers, and notes that safety data sheets call for appropriate PPE and self-contained breathing apparatus. The Hong Kong note adds that water may accelerate decomposition before the cargo is effectively cooled, and asks operators to review emergency procedures so that crews can apply water directly to a UN 3378 fire in time. Solvay’s sheet makes the matching point for packaged product: water is the preferred extinguishing medium, but packages not directly involved in the fire should be kept dry and moved away if possible. On board, EmS schedules F-A and S-Q, assigned to UN 3378, and the ship’s emergency plan govern the response.

Package Size and Thermal Stability: The Open Question

Thermal stability data from small laboratory samples may not represent the behaviour of sodium percarbonate in commercial packages or in a full container load. Heat generation depends on the quantity and condition of the reacting material and rises with temperature. Heat loss depends on package geometry and thermal properties, liners, pallet configuration, heat transfer between neighbouring packages and the surrounding temperature. Package size and total cargo mass are separate variables: 20 tonnes in 25 kg bags does not necessarily behave like 20 tonnes in flexible IBCs, and a container load does not necessarily react as one homogeneous mass.

The English Commercial Court dealt with a scale question of this kind for calcium hypochlorite, a different oxidizing substance, in the Maersk Seoul judgment: the stability test relied on had been run on a 15 mg sample, the cartons were block-stowed without air circulation, and no test representative of a full container load had been done. The case illustrates the testing gap. It is not evidence that sodium percarbonate behaves the same way.

For sodium percarbonate the questions that need test data are:

  • Product: the effect of coating, residual moisture content and transition-metal impurities on stability.
  • Package: heat generation against heat loss at the package sizes actually shipped, including flexible IBCs, with their geometry and liners.
  • Container: the effect of pallet configuration, stowage density, ambient temperature, daily temperature cycling and voyage duration.

These are research priorities. No published evidence reviewed for this article establishes that package size or loading density caused the 2026 fires.

Checks for Shippers, Packers and Carriers

Correct classification and declaration do not guarantee that the product stays chemically stable for the voyage. The club alerts, the Hong Kong note and Solvay’s handling sheet point to the following checks. They are club and manufacturer guidance, not IMDG Code requirements.

  • Container condition: sound, clean and dry, with no roof or door-seal leaks, a dry floor and no residue of previous cargo.
  • Packing the container: Solvay’s transport guidance is to protect the product from weather and moisture, leave space between packages for airflow, use only dried timber pallets (20% moisture maximum), keep incompatible materials out, and keep containers away from heat sources such as steam pipes.
  • Stacking: Solvay’s warehouse limits are one pallet high for 25 kg bags, two high for bulk bags, and at least one foot between pallets for air circulation. These are manufacturer limits for warehouse storage, not container-stuffing rules. A container stuffed tighter than that has less cooling than the manufacturer allows in a warehouse.
  • Booking review: NorthStandard asks for extreme caution when accepting bookings for this cargo, particularly from the two named ports. Read the safety data sheet and review stowage and segregation. The IMDG Code permits stowage on deck or under deck, so an affected container may sit where access and firefighting are harder.
  • Temperature monitoring: take a baseline surface reading after loading with an infrared thermometer or thermal camera, repeat at the same points, and compare with neighbouring containers. A sustained unexplained rise is the warning sign. Sunlight, container colour, weather and nearby heat sources affect readings, and a surface reading is not the temperature inside the cargo. Solvay notes that decomposition is hard to detect until steam, a surface temperature above 40°C or a ballooning package appears.
  • Readiness: piercing nozzle or fog lance on board, crew drilled in its use, and the emergency plan reviewed against EmS schedules F-A and S-Q.

Whether the 2026 fires share a manufacturer, a batch, a packaging method, a moisture exposure or a loading arrangement is not yet public.

References
  1. The Swedish Club, “Container fires involving UN 3378 sodium percarbonate”, Member Alert, 9 November 2026. https://www.swedishclub.com/news/member-alert/container-fires-involving-un-3378-sodium-percarbonate/
  2. NorthStandard, “ALERT: Container Fires Involving UN 3378 Sodium Carbonate Peroxhydrate”, 7 and 16 October 2026. https://north-standard.com/insights-and-resources/resources/news/alert-container-fires-involving-un-3378-sodium-carbonate-peroxhydrate
  3. Marine Safety Investigation Unit, Malta, Safety Investigation Report No. 06/2023, MV CMA CGM Rabelais, April 2023. https://msiu.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/CMA-CGM-Rabelais_Final-Safety-Investigation-Report.pdf
  4. Hong Kong Marine Department, Merchant Shipping Information Note No. 5/2026, 18 May 2026. https://www.mardep.gov.hk/filemanager/en/share/msnote/pdf/msin2605.pdf
  5. International Chemical Safety Card ICSC 1744, Sodium Percarbonate, March 2009. https://www.inchem.org/documents/icsc/icsc/eics1744.htm
  6. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., “Sodium Percarbonate Safety & Handling” Technical Data Sheet, PCS-SH 08/2019. https://solvay.com/sites/g/files/srpend616/files/2019-10/PCS%20Sodium%20Percarbonate%20Safety%20and%20Handling%20Information.pdf

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By Shashi Kallada

35 years in Merchant Shipping, Last 23 years working on IMDG Code. Ex Sailor, Ex Manager Global Dangerous Goods Maersk Line.

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